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Abstract
This thesis investigates the relationship between foreign intervention and state
failure. I argue that even an ideal international multilateral humanitarian intervention in a
weak state will lead to deepening state failure if the intervention was biased and driven
by material rather than ethical interests, focusing on achieving military victory of one
party of the internal conflict rather than a negotiated settlement between all conflict
parties and ignores the responsibility to rebuild in the aftermath of the intervention.
In making this argument, I developed a conceptual framework to analyse the
impact of intervention motives, patterns, forms and instruments on strengthening or
decreasing the capacity of the state to carry out its functions on the political, security, and
economic levels. I applied this framework on the Libyan case study, focusing on
intervention in Libya in 2011. Libya has long been a weak state which persisted during
the Gaddafi regime. Prior to the intervention in 2011, the Gaddafi regime’s opening with
western countries harvested the seeds for political change. The motives of the interveners
in Libya in 2011 were mainly self-interested rather than the declared humanitarian
purposes to protect civilians. The interveners’ political end goal was centred around
Gaddafi regime change and the military mission evolved to match this political goal. The
instruments of intervention were both military and non-military under authorization from
the UN Security Council. The pattern of intervention was a biased intervention that
altered the balance of power in favour of the rebels with the aim of helping them achieve
fast victory rather than achieving a negotiated settlement. With the ousting of Gaddafi
regime, the military intervention ended without engaging in a state building effort. The
result was that in the aftermath of the intervention, Libya turned from a weak state during
the Gaddafi regime into a failed state during the post-Gaddafi regime.
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Introduction
Over the last three decades, "state failure" has become a defining pattern for many
Arab countries. I will argue in this thesis that foreign intervention has been a crucial
reason for several cases of such failure. Foreign intervention and state failure have an
intricate relationship. As Iqbal and Starr (2015) note in their study on state failure, “State
failure, like any other phenomenon ... its onset, termination, duration, recurrence, and
consequences are bound up with ... the involvement of the international community’’.1
Hence, “assessments of international involvement before collapse, and intervention after
collapse, would yield valuable insights into the occurrence of this phenomenon.”2 In
keeping with this admonition, this thesis investigates the relationship between foreign
intervention and state failure. Specifically, it asks: why do interventions that are
ostensibly supposed to protect civilians often lead to state failure, further endangering the
lives of civilians?
I argue that even an ideal international multilateral humanitarian intervention in a
weak state will lead to deepening state failure if the intervention was biased and driven
by material rather than ethical interests because such material interests lead interveners to
put insufficient resources towards rebuilding in the aftermath of the intervention. In order
to show this relation between state failure and foreign intervention, I will focus on the
Libyan case study in 2011, which became one of the most outstanding cases of state
failure in the Arab world following a foreign intervention. In 2011, Libya witnessed
rapid political unrest, followed by a humanitarian emergency. As a result, the United
Nations (UN) authorised international intervention under the banner of the international

1
2

Zaryab Iqbal, and Harvey Starr, 2015. State failure in the modern world. Stanford University Press. p.124.
Zaryab Iqbal, and Harvey Starr. p.125.
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community’s “responsibility to protect.” The intervention ended Gaddafi’s 42 years in
power, which raised hopes for a new democratic Libya. These aspirations were shattered
as the country descended into chaos. Even the initial verdicts that the intervention was a
resounding success were quickly replaced by pessimistic conclusions that Libya is
becoming a failed state.3 For instance, Libya’s ranking according to the Fund for Peace
Fragile States Index (FSI) has declined in the aftermath of the revolution from 111th rank
in 2011 to occupy 28th rank in 2019.4 Libya’s ranking in corruption has also declined
from 146th in 2010 to 170th in 2018 according to Corruption Perceptions Index.5
Moreover, Libya has declined according to the governance indicators in 2017 issued by
the World Bank over the past 6 years particularly since 20116. Furthermore, Libya’s
ranking in Human Development Index (HDI) has declined from 53 in 2010 to 108 in
20177.
This failure occurred despite the fact that the international intervention in Libya in
2011 was considered an ideal model of multilateral humanitarian intervention authorized
by the UN Security Council (UNSC) with the support of the Arab League (AL) and the
Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC). It was carried out by an international
coalition at the onset before its completion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). This best-case scenario of intervention produced what can be reasonably
Christopher Hobson, (2016) ‘Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after
Libya’, Millennium. p.44.
4
J. Messner et al. (eds) (2019) Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019. Washington, DC: Fund for
Peace. viewed 15th of April 2019 at: https://fragilestatesindex.org/2019/04/07/fragile-states-index-2019annual-report/
5
Transparency International. (2018). Global Corruption Perception Index, 2018, Transparency
International. viewed 15th of April 2019 at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018
6
World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project. The World Bank, Washington DC, USA
(2018) viewed 15th of April 2019 at: www.govindicators.org
7
United Nations Development Programme. "Human development indices and indicators: 2018 Statistical
update." (2018).
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf
3

4

described as disaster situation of state failure in Libya. This thesis asks why. Through
focusing on the Libyan case study, my research shows how the mechanism of even a
best-case scenario of international intervention transformed a weak state of Libya into a
failed state following the foreign intervention.
Background and literature Review:
Scholars and analysts disagree about the role of foreign intervention in the process
of state failure, with some arguing that intervention is a cause of state failure while others
argue that intervention is a consequence of state failure. The first approach views
intervention as a consequence of state failure because such failure has repercussions on
regional and international security and hence it requires external intervention either to
control it or to rebuild those states.8 The second approach views external interventions as
the main cause of “state failure,” under the assumption that interventions are ultimately
conducted to serve the strategic interests of the intervenor. Scholars in this second school
argue that intervention is not ethically driven pursuit but is instead selectively applied
only on weak states that lack strong protectors.9
Both approaches have limitations. The first approach undermines any significant
negative role or unintended consequence of foreign intervention in the process of state
failure. The second approach ignores any ethical and legal motives behind intervention,
8

For the first approach see for instance: Robert I. Rotberg, Ed. When states fail causes and consequences.
Princeton University Press. 2010. Mallaby Sebastian. The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States,
and the Case for American Empire, “Foreign Affairs”, Vol. 81, No. 2. 2002. pp. 2-7. Brinkerhoff Derick W.
State fragility and failure as wicked problems: beyond naming and taming. “Third World Quarterly”, Vol.
35, No. 2. 2014. pp. 333–344.
9
For the second approach see for instance: Noam Chomsky. Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the
Assault on Democracy: American Empire Project, Owl Books. 2007. Charlest Call. The Fallacy of the
‘Failed State. “Third World Quarterly”, Vol. 29, No. 8. 2008. pp. 1491–1507. Sonja Grimm, et al (eds.).
The Political Invention of Fragile States: The Power of Ideas. Routledge; 1st edition. 2014. Mary
Manjikian. Diagnosis, Intervention, and Cure: The Illness Narrative in the Discourse of the Failed State,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 33, No. 3. 2008. pp. 335-357.
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and it does not offer an analytical framework through which intervention might produce
state failure. Thus, we need to understand the mechanism through which foreign
intervention leads to state failure.
Within the broader literature on humanitarian intervention, there has been much
research on the international humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011 under the
concept of Responsibility to protect (R2P). There is a wide agreement on the current state
of failure in Libya. However, scholars and analysts disagree on the responsibility of
humanitarian intervention in this regard. The first approach views the Libyan intervention
as a resounding success that achieved its goal and prevented the Gadhafi regime from
committing mass atrocities and explains the subsequent state failure as the result of
domestic politics dynamics.10 The second approach views that the intervention as a
debacle resulting in more atrocities and turning Libya into a failed state.11 The third
approach views Libya as not the sole benchmark to measure R2P against, suggesting that
what is important for the international community now is how to practically implement it
in specific cases.12
Each approach has explanatory challenges for accounting for the failure in Libya.
The first approach downplayed the possible negative effects or unintended consequences
of humanitarian intervention. It focused mainly on the immediate outcome of intervention
in terms of the success of the military operation in supporting the political goal of
“repressive” regime change and helping assumed civilians rebelling against “oppressive”
10

For the first approach see: Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis. "NATO's victory in Libya: the right
way to run an intervention." Foreign Affairs (2012): 2-7.
11
For the second approach see for instance: Alan Kuperman."Obama's Libya debacle: how a well-meaning
intervention ended in failure." Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015): 66-77. Rajan Menon. The conceit of
humanitarian intervention. Oxford University Press, 2016.
12
For the third approach see: Simon Adams. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect. Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2012.
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regime to achieve a military victory. It hailed this model of intervention in terms of
NATO burden sharing with wide regional support. This approach didn’t underscore the
internal and external determinants of interventions in Libya in 2011, the methods of
intervention and the impact of intervention outcome on the Libyan state’s capacity to
carry out its mandated functions in post conflict period at the security, economic, and
political levels.
The second approach does not provide us with the mechanism through which
humanitarian intervention leads to state failure. It focuses mainly on the methods of
intervention by criticizing the ethics of intervention in Libya on humanitarian grounds. It
highlights the conduct of intervention as biased and as violating UN security council
resolutions 1970 and 1973 by supporting the rebels with weapons, training and military
advisors. Moreover, this approach highlights the moral hazard of humanitarian
intervention that the anti-Gaddafi fighters turned to violence at an early stage, lobbied
actively for external intervention following a crackdown by the regime, and publicised
inflated figures on civilian deaths. Furthermore, this approach underscores, in broad
terms, the unintended consequences of intervention from state dysfunction to
endangering the security in the region. This approach tells us little about the internal and
external determinants of interventions in Libya in 2011 and the impact of intervention
outcome on the Libyan state’s capacity to carry out its mandated functions in post
conflict period at the security, economic, and political levels.
The third approach underscores the need to learn from Libyan case for better
future application of humanitarian intervention. Yet, barring an understanding of the
specific mechanisms by which the intervention caused state failure, what the practical

7

lessons are for conducting interventions more effectively will remain unclear. Therefore,
I find it important to highlight this mechanism.
Argument:
I argue that a biased intervention in a weak state, driven by material interests rather
than ethical ones, focuses on achieving a military victory of one party of the internal
conflict rather than a negotiated settlement between all conflict parties, and ignores the
responsibility to rebuild in the aftermath of the intervention will lead to deepening state
failure in the aftermath of the intervention. In making this argument, I develop the
conceptual framework provided by Sang Ki Kimi (2012) on the mechanism of third-party
intervention in civil wars to analyse the impact of intervention motives, patterns, forms
and instruments on strengthening or decreasing the capacity of the state to carry out its
functions on the political, security, and economic levels. Figure (1) describes the
conceptual framework.
Figure (1) The Conceptual Framework
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The theoretical framework explains the mechanism through which humanitarian
intervention could produce deeper state failure. It is based on three pillars:
1- The determinants of intervention. include both internal and external determinants. The
internal determinants refer to the internal environment that allows intervention and is
unable to prevent it.

It could also include internal actors who might invite

intervention to enhance their relative position in internal conflict. The external
determinant of intervention includes external actor/s wishing to intervene in a certain
state, either for value-oriented determinants or self-material interest determinants.
These external actors might intervene through creating an environment within a state
that would be permissive for intervention, or they might intervene if they perceive
that the existing environment within such states represents either an opportunity to
pursue interests or a source of threat to avert risks.
2- Intervention methods refer to the mechanisms through which an intervention is
conducted. They include the patterns of intervention (biased intervention or neutral
intervention), the form of intervention (unilateral intervention or multilateral
intervention by the UN), and the instruments of intervention (military or non-military
instruments).
3- Intervention outcomes (military victory or negotiated settlement) refer to the impact
of the intervention on the affected state’s capacity to carry out its mandated functions
in the post conflict period at the security, economic, social, political and humanitarian
levels. The intervention might strengthen or weaken a state’s capacity to carry out
those functions on the different levels. Figure (2) describes the state failure typology
presented by Paul D. Miller (2010) which is based on combining five types of state
9

failure: anarchic, illegitimate, incapable, unproductive, and barbaric states with three
ascending degrees of failure: Weak, failed/failing and collapsed. There are many
Indexes13 that can capture the general trend of state capacity in performing its
functions over time. By comparing these indexes before and after the intervention we
can underscore the change in state performance.
Therefore, in order to explain the mechanism through which humanitarian
intervention could produce state failure, my research will examine the following three
hypotheses:
1- The determinant of intervention guides the methods of intervention and the timing
of intervention.
2- Intervention methods influence the duration and outcome of the internal conflict
and affect the state’s capacity to carry out its functions on the security, economic,
social, political and humanitarian levels in post conflict period.
3- Conflict outcomes (Military Victory or Negotiated Settlement) that may be
products of intervention affect state capacity to carry out its functions in post
conflict period.

13

Theses indexes include: Fragile States Index, The Worldwide Governance Indicators, Human
Development Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, Global Peace Index and Global Terrorism Index.
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Figure (2)
Paul D. Miller Typology of State Failure

The source: Miller, Paul D (2010, p.176).
In the Libyan case, this explanatory mechanism can be applied as follows: Libya
has long been a weak state with weak institutions which persisted during the Gaddafi
regime. Prior to the intervention in 2011, the Gaddafi regime’s opening with western
countries since 2003 harvested the seeds for political change which was reaped by the
perceived window of opportunity for regime change that came with the Arab Spring. The
motives of the interveners in Libya were mainly self-interested rather than the declared
humanitarian purposes of the R2P civilians. The interveners’ political end goal was
centred around Gaddafi regime change and the military mission evolved to match this
political goal. The instruments of intervention were both military and non-military
(imposing economic sanctions and arm embargo) under authorization from the UNSC.
Following UNSC authorization, the form of intervention started via France, UK and USA
under the leadership of US then the leadership of the intervention transferred to NATO.
Moreover, the pattern of intervention was a biased intervention that altered the balance of
power in favour of the intervener (supporting the rebels) with the aim of helping them
achieve fast victory rather than achieving a negotiated settlement.
With the ousting of Gaddafi regime, the military intervention ended without
engaging in a stabilization phase or state building efforts, hoping that Libya will stabilize
11

itself. The result was in the aftermath of the intervention, Libya turned from a weak state
during the Gaddafi regime into a failed state during the post-Gaddafi regime. It was
characterized by violent struggle over power accompanied by rivalry over the control of
security sector, which led to the establishment of parallel security institutions. There was
also a struggle over the control of key assets that led to the establishment of parallel
economic institutions.
Organization of the Research:
The first chapter of the research examines the internal determinants for intervention
within Libya. The second chapter examines the external determinants of intervention in
Libya. The third chapter highlights the mechanisms of interventions in Libya in 2011.
The fourth chapter illustrates the outcome of intervention on the political, security and
economic levels.
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Chapter I: The Internal Determinants of Intervention in Libya

The internal determinants include the determinants within Libya that increase the
vulnerability of the country for foreign intervention. Historically, Libya has long been a
weak state.14 Moreover, Libya has been an arena of foreign interventions in its recent
history since the imperial period in the first decade of the 19th century. The interventions
by the Ottomans and the Italians (1911-1922) and later by the British, French and
Americans (1943-1969) resulted in “strengthening local non-state political identities and
alliances, creating incentives and opportunities for provincial powerbrokers to use
international patrons to reinforce their authority and prolong their dominance across
generations”.15
When Gaddafi came to power in 1969, he demanded the evacuation of the British
and American military bases and supported what he called revolutionary movements over
the world. As a result, Libya has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, and
subject to sanctions.16 Gaddafi’s distrust of international norms, including those
governing sovereignty and statehood in addition to his attempts to consolidate his grip
over power led him to deliberately undermine state institutions in favor of patronage
networks utilizing income from Libya’s natural resources. This has resulted in the
continuity of Libya as a weak state with weak institutions over four decades in what is
scholarly known as Gaddafi’s legacy. 17

14

Until its independence in 1951, Libya had never been governed by a single entity and the central state
was weak, and, outside of the coastal towns, the territory was controlled by local tribes. Jean-Louis
Romanet Perroux. "The Deep Roots of Libya’s Security Fragmentation." Middle Eastern Studies (2019): 3.
15
Lisa Anderson. "" They Defeated Us All": International Interests, Local Politics, and Contested
Sovereignty in Libya." The Middle East Journal 71, no. 2 (2017): 239.
16
Anderson 2017, p. 239.
17
For further information see Lisa Watanabe. "Libya: In the Eye of the Storm." CSS Analysis in Security
Policy 193 (2016). p.3. Romanet Perroux, Jean-Louis. 2019. pp. 1-25. Edward Randall. "After Gaddafi:
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Gaddafi kept the army weak to prevent the emergence of potential competitors. He
sidelined the army and police role in favour of parallel and unofficial structures of the
regime's revolutionary security committees and revolutionary guards responsible for the
regime survival.18 In addition, Gaddafi regime entrenched unequal development on a
regional basis which resulted in escalation of regionalism identity. Moreover, Gaddafi
resorted to the tribes politically since 1993 in order to stabilize his regime by building
informal tribal alliances as a result of attempts to seize power in 1990s, which resulted in
nepotism and tribal favouritism. 19
During 2000s there was an internal reform attempt led by Gaddafi’s son, Saif AlIslam (SAI). SAI was seen by the western policy makers as the best prospect of effecting
political change in Libya.20 As a result of his increasing influence, the regime began to
take a conciliatory approach to the western countries since 2003. The regime’s
motivation was survival after Saddam Husain’s fall in Iraq.21 Consequently, the Gaddafi
regime acknowledged responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to pay
compensation to victims, in addition to privatizing the economy. The UN and then US
sanctions were lifted shortly thereafter, and the west started normalizing relations with
the regime.

Development and democratization in Libya." The Middle East Journal 69, no. 2 (2015): 204. Tim
Eaton. Libya's War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness. Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 2018. p.5
18
For further information see: Martínez, Luis. "Libya from Paramilitary Forces to Militias: The Difficulty
of Constructing a State Security Apparatus." Policy Alternatives (2014):2. Florence Gaub. "Libya: The
Struggle for Security." European Union Institute for Security Studies, June (2013). P.2.
19
Mohamed El-Katiri. 2012. State-building Challenges in a Post-revolution Libya. Army war college.
Strategic Studies Institute. PA. p. ix
20
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Libya: Examination of Intervention and collapse and the
UK’s future policy options. Third Report of Sessions, 17. 2016. P.18. Alison Pargeter. Libya: The rise and
fall of Gaddafi. Yale University Press, 2012. P.203.
21
Randall 2015, p.207.
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The economic reform policy headed by Shukri Ghanem -an ally of SAI -as prime
minister in the period 2003-2006, resulted in the emergence of new entrepreneurial class
of capitalist- reformist. This new class, in addition to a mixed group of businessmen and
recently returned Libyan emigres, saw SAI as a bridge between the old repressive regime
and newly free one.22 Moreover, SAI adopted an appeasement policy towards Libya's
Islamists, (the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), as well as the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG)) in the mid-2000s, to neutralize their opposition to the regime.
From 2009 to 2010, SAI spearheaded the release of 946 high profile “Islamist prisoner”
in Abu Selim prison in return for Islamist recognition of the regime, and renunciation of
violence. 23
SAI championed reform measures that sowed the seeds of 2011 rebellion. Over
concerns of being sidelined by the old guards of the regime, the new class of a mixed
group of capitalists- reformist, businessmen and recently returned Libyan emigres would
join the political front of the rebellion. Furthermore, the released “Islamists” assumed
leadership or fighting roles in the rebellion against the regime from February 2011
onwards.24 Ghanem’s limited economic reform policy of cutting state subsidies on basic
goods angered many Libyans.25 Moreover, the opening period in Libya during the 2000s
encouraged new lines of corruption that was perceived as benefiting Gaddafi’s direct
family members.26 This pushed people to feel angrier from the regime particularly with
Wikileaks’ release of cables from US embassy in Tripoli which underscored the

22

Ethan Chorin. Exit the Colonel: The hidden History of the Libyan revolution. Public Affairs, 2012. P. 94.
Chorin, 2012, p.150
24
Chorin, 2012, p.150
25
Pargeter 2012, p.195.
26
Pargeter 2012, p.207. M. El-Katiri. 2012. p.6
23
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corruption of Gaddafi family and the need for regime change. 27 The opening period also
witnessed the introduction of the internet and social media into Libya which played later
a significant role in the uprising.28

27

Ronald Bruce St John. Libya: From colony to revolution. One world Publications, 2017.p.283
Masudul Biswas, and Carrie Sipes. "Social Media in Syria’s uprising and post-revolution Libya: an
analysis of activists’ and Blogger’s online engagement." Arab Media & Society 19 (2014): 1.
28
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Chapter II: The External Determinants of Intervention in Libya

The external determinants include both value-oriented morale determinants or
self-interest material determinants that represent incentives for foreign actors to
intervene. The US played an indispensable political and military role in the intervention
in Libya. However, this role has been downplayed by the US administration as “leading
from behind”.29 France and UK assumed the lead in pushing for and carrying out the
military intervention in Libya. However, Paris was so proactive one step ahead in the
intervention while London was more cautious and found itself repeatedly one step
behind. 30
The UK and US preferred the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to take the
command for the military mission from the US command in the initial phase while
France preferred a bilateral military command of the operation with the UK.

31

While

NATO finally led the military operation, France and UK initiated International Contact
Group on Libya (ICG) as a political coordination mechanism for NATO military

Ryan Lizza. “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy”. The New
Yorker April 25, 2011. Viewed April 12, 2019 at: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/theconsequentialist
30
France took the lead in launching air strikes, Recognizing the Libyan National Transitional Council,
initiating the International Contact group on Libya, and most importantly refusing the UK suggested
military pause of operations after securing Benghazi. For further information see Madelene Lindström, and
Kristina Zetterlund. "Setting the stage for the military intervention in Libya." Decisions Made and Their
Implications for the EU and NATO. Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Defence (2012). P.13. The House of
Commons. Oral evidence: Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK's future policy
options, January 19th, 2016. Viewed February 1st, 2019 at:
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairscommittee/libya-examination-of-intervention-and-collapse-and-the-uks-future-policyoptions/oral/27184.html
31
Sergei Boeke and van Zuijdewijn J. de Roy. "Transitioning from military interventions to long-term
counter-terrorism policy: The case of Libya (2011-2016)." Security and Global affairs (2016). P.26.
29
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operation. In effect “the ICG was an international umbrella organization for those
external actors involved in bringing about regime change”. 32
The declared rationale of the multilateral military intervention in Libya as expressed
publicly was a moral humanitarian purpose under R2P principle as the Libyan
government’s columns were approaching Benghazi. The political end goal was regime
change. However, ‘regime change’ was pitched as a desirable indirect consequence of the
multilateral military intervention (not explicit military end goal), attached to a solely
humanitarian cause.

33

This political end goal was explicit in French and American

official statements, most notably President Sarkozy’s early position that “Gaddafi has to
go”,34 and president Obama statement that “U.S. policy that Gaddafi needs to go". 35The
UK prime minister was more cautious in articulating a direct political desire to see
Gaddafi ousted. Sir David Richards, then the UK’s Chief of the Defense Staff, admitted
later that after securing Benghazi “the humanitarian rationale morphed into a change of
regime one”. 36
USA, France and UK political end goal of regime change in Libya was confirmed in a
joint op-ed by their respective heads of governments published on 15 April 2015, they
argued that “our duty and mandate under UNSC Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians. It

32

Van Genugten, Saskia M. Italian and British relations with Libya pride and privileges 1911–2011. The
Johns Hopkins University, 2012.p.348.
33
In addressing this question, Paul Tang Abomo concluded that:”The political goal was to see Gaddafi step
down and the military mission evolved to match the political goal. With NATO taking over, the military
mission changed from protecting civilians to degrading the military capacities of Libyan forces so that the
Libyan people could take charge of their destiny. It practically became a call for regime change”. Paul Tang
Abomo. "R2P Norm of “Reaction” in US Foreign Policy Toward the Libyan Civil War." In R2P and the
US Intervention in Libya, pp. 169-213. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019. P.210.
34
Valentina Pop. France says Gaddafi must go, as EU finalises sanctions. February 25th, 2011. Viewed
February 3rd, 2019 at: https://euobserver.com/news/31876.
35
Remarks by President Obama and President Sebastian Pinera of Chile at Join Press Conference, March
21, 2011. Viewed February 3rd , 2019
at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/03/21/remarks-president-obama-and-president-sebastian-pinera-chile-join-press36
The House of Commons. Oral evidence. 2016.
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is not to remove Gaddafi by force. However, it is impossible to imagine a future for
Libya with Gaddafi in power”. 37
US perceived the intervention in Libya as achievable based on the condition that it
will be limited in time and space.The US officials sustained the position that there is no
direct vital interest for the US to intervene in Libya and US interests to support the
intervention as a moral obligation to prevent assumed looming genocide as well as to pay
back to its allies France and Britain who stood by the USA side in Afghanistan. In
addition, the US may have economic interests in the Libyan oil as the first country to buy
oil from the Libyan NTC’s.
President Sarkozy’s plans for the intervention in Libya were driven by the following
internal as well as external interests: “A desire to gain a greater share of Libya oil
production,38 increase French influence in North Africa, improve his internal political
situation in France, provide the French military with an opportunity to reassert its
position in the world, address the concern of his advisors over Gaddafi’s long term plans
to supplant France as the dominant power in Francophone Africa”. 39
UK, like the US, perceived the intervention as doable one based on three conditions:
demonstrable need, legal basis, and regional support. Prime Minister Cameron, like his
predecessor Tony Blair, may have wanted to demonstrate his leadership on global
Joint op-ed by President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy: ‘Libya’s Pathway to
Peace’’,
White
House
Press
Release,
2011,
Viewed
December
3,
2018
at:
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/14/joint-op-ed-president-obama-primeminister-cameron-and-president-sarkozy.
38
Seven days after the passing of Resolution 1973, France is said to have concluded a deal with the NTC
stipulating that, together with Qatar, France would be guaranteed 35 percent of the oil contracts in
exchange for its total and permanent support of the Libyan Transitional Council. Vittorio De Filippis.
Pétrole : l’accord secret entre le CNT et la France. September 1 st 2011. Viewed February 2nd, 2019 at:
https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2011/09/01/petrole-l-accord-secret-entre-le-cnt-et-la-france_758320
39
US Department of State, H: France’s client and Q’s gold. Sid’, 2011, viewed 5th of January 2019 at:
https://www.foia.state.gov/Search/results.aspx?searchText=C05779612&beginDate=&endDate=&publishe
dBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=
37
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security issues, remain relevant to the US when it called for someone else to take the lead
in Libya, and strengthen his internal political credibility. In addition to economic interest
in the Libyan oil and gas.40
The timing of the intervention is very revealing: it occurred barely one month after
the rebellion against Gaddafi broke out. The US early reluctance to intervene changed
after intelligence assessment showed clear evidence that Gaddafi’s forces would prevail
in the end. 41 Coalition operations began two days after the passing of UNSCR 1973 by
attacking Gaddafi’s forces advancing on Benghazi about 40 miles from Benghazi.42 Had
Gaddafi’s forces not been stopped, Gaddafi would have been able to consolidate his
position in the east of the country and the rebels would have been seriously undermined
because Benghazi was the NTC’s base.43
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Chapter III: The mechanism of Intervention in Libya
Intervention methods reflect interveners’ motives, goals, and make differences in
intervention outcome.44 The criteria within the Libyan context is how the conduct of the
intervention is in conformity with its declared and mandated ethical goal of international
community being the responsibility to protect (R2P) authorized by Resolution 1973.45
The Principles for humanitarian intervention under the norm of R2P was outlined in “The
responsibility to protect report” by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty in December 2001. The most notable principles to be underscored in
the Libyan case are as follows: the just cause, the right intention, last resort, and
proportional means.
1- The Just Cause:
In the Libyan case, there might be a just cause for military intervention to prevent
attacks against civilians. This was underscored in the first report of UN Human Rights
Council (HRC) commission of Inquiry in Libya in June 2011 that Government forces
have committed serious violations “amounting to war crimes” and “crimes against
humanity”.46 However, the second report of HRC commission of inquiry in March 2012,
concluded that the thuwar (anti-Gaddafi force) have committed “war crimes and crimes
against humanity.47 This was also confirmed in an Amnesty International investigation in
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June 2011 that Western media coverage has ignored evidence that the protest movement
exhibited a violent aspect from very early on.48 Moreover, many Western policymakers
“proposed that Gaddafi would have ordered the massacre of civilians in Benghazi if those
forces had been able to enter the city”. 49 This proposition, according to the findings of
UK foreign affairs committee of House of Commons (HOC), “was not supported by “the
available evidence”.50 The findings of House of Commons further highlight that UK
Government strategy in Libya was founded “on erroneous assumptions and an
incomplete understanding of the evidence” due to incomplete intelligence.51 This
conclusion was also highlighted by some officials of US intelligence community that
“there was no specific evidence of an impending genocide in Libya in spring 2011” and
advocacy for intervention against the Libyan regime rested more on speculative
arguments of what might happen to civilians than on facts reported from the ground”.52
2- The Right Intention:
The right intention for intervention under the R2P norm was to protect civilians as it
was demonstrated in the UNSC resolution 1973 by “authorizing Member States to take
all necessary measures to protect civilians”, while “excluding a foreign occupation force
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of any form on any part of Libyan territory”,53 and confirmed in NATO political end
goals for its Libya campaign. However, a regime change was not part of the UNSC
mandate.54
It is possible that NATO’s intervention was born of a desire to protect civilians.
However, within a few weeks of launching the operation, NATO took actions that were
unnecessary or inconsistent with protecting civilians, but which fostered regime change.55
This was also confirmed in the House of Common findings that “The combination of
coalition airpower with the supply of arms, intelligence and personnel to the rebels
guaranteed the military defeat of the Gaddafi regime. 56
The US, France, and UK (P3) justification was that that the opposition forces had to
be supported by military means. Nonetheless, the deployment of 'occupation forces' on
the ground was not authorized by UNSC, even though the No-fly zones and air
campaigns have in the past proven insufficient.57 Nonetheless, the intentions of the
interveners were challenged. In early 2011, foreign governments backing the National
Transitional Council (NTC) only had a vague idea whom they were providing with
weapons, intelligence and other support. Some policymakers raised concerns about the
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fact that those fighting on the side of the opposition seemed to include extremist
element.58
Moreover, NATO’s support for the rebels seeking regime change was premised
on Gaddafi being identified as a permanent threat to the human rights of Libyans. Given
this, the fact that rebel forces were responsible for widespread human rights abuses 59
raises difficult questions for those who supported the intervention. Furthermore, it seems
that there was an exaggeration of death toll that lead to the intervention. It was also the
threat of massacres that seems to have justiﬁed the action, not the numbers already
killed.60
In contrast to NATO’s Secretary-General claim that NATO-led forces had
prevented a massacre and saved countless lives,61 Alan J. Kuperman argues that as a
result of NATO’s intervention, Libya’s war lasted 36 weeks instead of 6 weeks and
magnified the death toll in Libya by about 7 to 27 times.62 Kuperman further argues that
the expectation of such intervention helped trigger or escalate the Libyan rebellion that
provoked government retaliation and thereby endangered civilians. Such a potential
dynamic is known as the ‘moral hazard’ of humanitarian intervention.63 This point was
also underscored by Rajan Menon that the anti-Gaddafi fighters turned to violence at an
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early stage, lobbied actively for external intervention following a crackdown by the
regime, and publicised inflated figures on civilian deaths.64
3- The Last Resort:
The last resort principle in the Libyan case is a debatable one. Some scholars
argue that military action in Libya was preceded by a range of non-military measures that
sought to persuade the Gaddafi regime to stop the killing. All the steps considered in
UNSC resolution 1970, including assets freeze, arms embargo, travel bans, and referring
the situation in Libya to The International Criminal Court (ICC), while coercive, were
peaceful.

65

It was only when these measures failed that the use of military force was

finally considered.66 On other hand, other scholars argued that the non-military option
for the peaceful resolution of the crisis was not given the required amount of time and the
military option was prioritized at the expense of a comprehensive political solution to the
Libyan crisis.67 The African Union (AU) had been able to reach a credible agreement
with Gaddafi.68 However, the NATO members on the UNSC had actively “blocked” the
AU’s attempts to peacefully resolve the Libyan conflict by refusing to allow AU
delegation to fly to Libya to “begin the process of mediating a peaceful resolution”.69
Moreover, the ICC referral may be one of the reasons why Gaddafi refused to take safe
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haven in another country.70 This is important point as Gaddafi might have been seeking
an exit from Libya in February and March 2011. 71 Had the conflict ended much earlier
with a negotiated settlement with Gaddafi’s exit could have better impact on the postconflict Libya.
4- Proportional means:
Proportional means in the Libyan case is contested. Counties of Brazil, India,
China, Russia and South Africa argue that it exceeded minimum necessary intervention
to secure the defined human protection objective. This was caused by violating the terms
of arms embargo under Resolution 1970 by some western states by supplying arms to
anti-Gaddafi forces and turning a blind eye to the supply of weapons to the rebels. They
also questioned the implementation of the no-fly zone that had been authorized by
Resolution 1973. NATO’s military actions visibly gave preferential support to the rebels
by no longer acting as a defensive shield for populations at risk, but as the NTC’s air
force.72 Moreover, the tactical use of NATO airpower to support the rebel offensive
against Tripoli, the bombing of Libyan TV and the attempted assassination by drone of
Gaddafi himself arguably strained the protecting civilian logic of R2P. 73 Furthermore, on
October. 20, 2011, it was a U.S. drone and French aircraft that attacked a convoy of
regime loyalists trying to flee Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte. Gaddafi’s was injured in the
attack, captured alive, and then extrajudicially murdered by rebel forces.74
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In June 2011, France admitted to supplying weapons to the rebels and Qatar allegedly
supplied militias connected to the NTC with tons of weaponry and admitted later that it
had hundreds of troops fighting against Gaddafi’s forces.75 Other forms of support from
France and UK included “providing battleground leadership advice during the final rebel
offensive on Tripoli and Sirte”,76 sending in military advisors, Special operations Forces
(SOF) and para-military intelligence ofﬁcers to help “train and arm the rebels”77 as well
as “deploying attacking helicopters to the conflict”.78 This was a direct violation of
resolution 1970 and not in keeping with the spirit of the civilian protection mandate
represented in Resolution 1973.
To sum up the mechanism of intervention, the form of intervention was multilateral
through US led international coalition, transferred later to the NATO leadership but
included some unilateral actions outside the NATO chain of command. The pattern of
intervention was a biased intervention against Gaddafi forces using combination of
coalition airpower with the supply of arms, intelligence and personnel (Military advisors
and SOF) to the rebels, which shifted the military balance in the Libyan civil war in favor
of the rebels. The instruments of intervention were military and non-military by imposing
sanctions and arms embargo on Gaddafi regime.
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The intervention, whether by design or default, was divisive in ensuring the victory of
Gaddafi’s opponents and led to the interveners political goal of regime change and the
military goal evolved gradually to match this political end goal. By the killing of Gaddafi,
the NATO intervention was called into end without any stabilization phase as the
interveners from the beginning want a short intervention without any long-term
involvement in costly effort of state building, they hoped that the country will stabilize
itself.79 The falling of Gaddafi regime left the fate of the state to the unknown given the
fact that the rebels included extremist elements.
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Chapter V: The outcomes of Intervention

In the aftermath of the intervention Libya turned form a weak state during the
Gaddafi regime into a failed state in post Gaddafi regime characterized by violent
struggle over power accompanied by rivalry over the control of security sector led to the
establishment of parallel security institutions, as well as a struggle over the control of key
assets led to the establishment of parallel economic institutions.
1- Violent struggle over power:
The vacuum caused by the ouster of Gaddafi regime left the fate of the Libyan
state in the hands of the rebels. The rebels against Gaddafi regime composed mainly of
two opposing camps. The Reformist camp, which include members of the post-2003
reform wing of the Gaddafi government. The Conservative camp, which include Gaddafi
opponents of the political Islam forces of the LMB and LIFG. After the capture of
Tripoli, rivalries between the two camps came on display with Islamist assassination of
NTC’s top general, secularist-leaning Abdul Fatah Younes.80
The two competing camps reappeared again during Libya’s first elections on 7
July 2012 to elect the General National Congress (GNC). Civilian-oriented camp,
represented by the coalition of National Forces Alliance (NFA), and Islamic-oriented
camp represented by the Justice and Construction Party (LMB), and the Nation Party
(LIFG). The relative majority obtained by NFA in 2012 elections demonstrated that
Libyans political preferences are against the Islamist parties.
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However, the NFA was not able to rule due to coercion and intimidation by its
Islamist opponents.81 Using violence and political maneuverers including the adoption of
the controversial political isolation law by the GNC on 5th of May 2013 under the
gunpoint of Islamist militias. The Islamists dominated the GNC and controlled the
government, then the Islamists tried to extend the mandate of GNC by one year beyond
the 7 February 2014 deadline. US previous special envoy for Libya underscored that
“western diplomats working on Libya generally agreed that their biggest collective
mistake was the failure to take action in May 2013 to refuse to recognize the lustration
law for what it was a power grab”.82
Under popular discontent, the GNC agreed to hold new parliamentary elections in
June 2014. The Islamists suffered a devastating loss at the ballot box. After the vote, they
took control of the capital militarily, and Islamist-dominated GNC refused to hand over
power to House of Representatives (HOR), the newly elected parliament, and filed a legal
challenge with the Supreme Court in Tripoli.83
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Two new rival military coalitions were formed after May 2014. “Operation
Dignity”, centred in eastern Libya and aligned with HOR, was led by Libyan National
Army (LNA) under the command of Gen. Khalifa Haftar. The declared aim of Operation
Dignity and the LNA was the defeat of Islamist in the cities of eastern Libya. On the
other side, a coalition of Islamist militias from western Libya dominated by militias from
the city of Misrata created the “Libya Dawn” coalition aligned with the former GNC and
its National Salvation Government. It supported Islamist militias in eastern Libya. 84 In
addition to the internal rivalry, Libya’s internal split in 2014 has created an arena for
regional rivalries, where Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates back Tobruk based HOR
and Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey stand behind the Islamist Tripoli based rival.
In January 2015, the UN launched the negotiations that would produce a Libyan
Political Agreement (LPA) by December 2015. It created the Government of National
Accord’s (GNA) Presidential Council (PC), that took office in Tripoli in March 2016 and
was tasked to form a government of national accord and an advisory High State Council
of former GNC members. The HOR was supposed to act as the sole legislative authority
in the country and approve a unity government.
UN sponsored LPA aim was a power-sharing deal to overcome institutional and
military fractures. The outcome was quite different. HOR authority saw the UN and the
talks’ Western backers as biased toward the Islamist dominated GNC and the accord
would produce another Tripoli-based government dominated by Islamist militias and
personalities and the implementation of its security arrangements (Article 8) would sideline its ally Haftar. Regardless of the HOR opposition, the agreement was pushed by the
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US, France and UK, raising further concerns towards the LPA.85

UNSC Resolution

2259 welcomed the accord. By January 2016, they recognised the PC as Libya’s
executive, treated its head Sarraj as de facto head of government and stopped engaging
with HOR Government. Moreover, USA, UK and Italy firmly supported the PC and
argued it should receive military aid.86 HOR refused to endorse the LPA, PC and
proposed GNA government in a no-confidence motion passed on 22 August 2016.87
The Tripoli based Islamist camp, which suffered from political influence decline
since 2014 election, regarded the UN political process as a channel through which they
remain politically relevant.88 They will be a part of a new government that enjoy
international recognition which they lacked since the election of HOR in 2014. 89
Moreover, the new government will be seated in Tripoli which is under the control of
their associated militia and armed groups.
The PC’s control of the capital and of ministries was limited.90 The Tripoli based
Islamist militias effectively control the government.91 The PC was not able to convene,
six out of its nine members became inactive over time. The GNA has been able to deliver
little for Libyans and has been criticized for its reliance upon Islamist militias to
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safeguard its presence in the capital. The LPA expired on 17 December 2017 and
extended later via UNSC resolutions making it clear that the GNA and the LPA are
unable to establish a new governance structure that would unify state institutions.92
Given such an unsustainable situation in Libya, the new UN envoy to Libya,
Ghassan Salamé launched UN Action Plan (UNAP) for Libya on 20 September 2017 to
create the necessary conditions for the completion of Libya’s post-conflict transition by
restructuring the current government,93 convening an inclusive national conference,
preparing for elections before September 2018. UNAP might be considered the only
international community face saving plan in Libya. However, it is facing serious
obstacles and the results are very uncertain. The three tracks of amending the LPA –
convening a Grand National Conference, constitution-building and general elections – are
either deadlocked or nearing complete collapse due to zero-sum game by Libyan actors
involved in the process. Moreover, Libyan parties have yet to agree on which elections
(presidential and/or parliamentary) to hold and in what sequence. Furthermore, neither
the legal nor the constitutional framework is in place at the time of writing.94
In May 2018, France sought to revamp the UNAP invited four Libyan leaders,
including Sarraj and Haftar, to Paris to sign off on a plan to adopt the necessary electoral
laws by September 16, 2018 and hold elections on December 10, 2018.95 On November
8, 2018, Salamé recalibrated UNAP which calls for a Libyan-led National Conference to
92
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be held in the first weeks of 2019 and the electoral process to begin in the spring of
2019. In November 2018, Italy sought to reviving again the UNAP in Libya, organized a
meeting in Palermo attended by delegations of three different competing Libyan
authorities. In which they agree on Adopting the referendum law to complete the
Constitutional process, holding electoral process by Spring 2019, and respect its results.96
All these deadlines have not been met or yet materialized. The revamping efforts of the
UN’s plan has been perceived as a competition between France and Italy over Libya due
to divergent interest97.
2- Rivalry over the Control of Security Sector
The rivalry between the civilian-oriented camp and Islamic-oriented camp on power
resulted in Libya’s transitional authorities were neither capable of exercising any
effective form of sovereignty over the territory nor of holding a monopoly over the
legitimate use of force which ultimately turned Libya into a failed state. Within the
context of this rivalry competition over security sector institutions is both a means to an
end to exert political influence or gain control over economic assets—and an end in
itself.98
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Gaddafi parallel security sector had been destroyed or scattered by the end of the
conflict. The regular Libyan armed forces had already partially disintegrated when the
regime fell.99 The civilian-oriented camp considered the former military and what
remained of Gaddafi’s formal security apparatus to be the backbone on which the new
institutions should be rebuilt. The Islamist oriented camp attempted to consolidate its
control over the new regime in Libya, they couldn’t trust the old security forces of the
Libyan army and police. They wanted to build wholesale a new army and a new police
force by integrating their loyal militia wholesale into the army and police. 100 The most
notable parallel Islamist leaning security forces established in this regard were the
Supreme Security Committee which was considered the parallel police force, the Libya
Shield Forces which was considered the parallel army forces.101
Therefore, Hybrid security institutions emerged immediately after the Libyan
uprising, combining formal and informal elements and allowing competing interests and
loyalties to prosper. Although Libya’s hybrid units continue to change later labels and
institutional affiliation, their political power brokers and their interests have been largely
constant. These competitions render the notion of loyalty to the state meaningless for
almost all parties. This explains why successive transitional governments have failed to

Virginie Collombier. “Make Politics, Not War: Armed Groups and Political Competition on PostGaddafi Libya”, In Bassma Kodmani and Nayla Moussa (eds.), Out of the Inferno? Rebuilding Security in
Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Arab Reform Initative. 2016. P.57.
100
Collombier 2016, p.59.
101
Naji Abou Khalil And Laurence Hargreaves. Perception of security in Libya and Institutional and
revolutionary actors. United States Institute of Peace. Peace works No. 108. 2015.Viewed November 3,
2018 at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191016/PW108-Perceptions-of-Security-in-Libya.pdf. Moreover,
the Islamist established an Integrity and Reform Commission for the armed forces in late June 2013. The
Commission aimed to exclude officers who had supported Gaddafi’s and retiring senior army officers. The
Commission’s efforts fuelled discontent within the army and contributed to the formation of the faction
now led by Gen. Haftar. Lacher and Cole 2014, p.27.
99

35

implement proper disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or security sector
reform processes.
3- Rivalry over the Control of Key Assets
Libya is a Petro-state in which oil and gas revenues account for around 96 percent of
state revenues.102 Two-thirds of hydrocarbon production comes from the east.
Competition for control of hydrocarbon resources, the infrastructure to exploit them and
the revenues derived from their sale are a central driver of the conflict. 103 This
competition has manifested itself in a military struggle over the so-called oil crescent, a
strip along the eastern coast of the Gulf of Sirte where four of Libya’s six hydrocarbon
export terminals are located and through which more than 50 percent of its crude oil
exports leave the country. This led to several oil terminal crises. For instance, during the
oil terminal crisis in 2016 and 2018 western countries spearheaded by the US intervened
to guarantee the flow of oil from Libya terminals in the east uninterrupted according to
the existing contacts.104 They put massive pressures on Haftar through the threat of being
subject to sanction to allow oil sales from eastern terminals to be managed by Tripoli
based NOC that was under the control of Islamist rather than Benghazi based NOC.
Convinced of its legitimacy, each camp fights to control key institutions. Most
notably, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the
National Oil Company (NOC), and the Libyan Post, Telecommunication and Information
Technology Company (LPTIC). In the east, the HOR in Tobruk and its government in
102
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Bayda, regarded control of the financial institutions as their right, since the HOR resulted
from the June 2014 elections. However, these four key institutions are under Tripoli’s
control and they jointly represent $157 billion.105
Furthermore, the international efforts led by the western counties to end Libya’s war
have reinforced Tripoli-based institutions’ monopoly on these matters rather than
reinforcing mutual sharing and manging of oil resources as a basis of power sharing
settlement. The UNSC backed LPA conferred international recognition upon the PC and
recognised the Tripoli-based CBL and the Tripoli-based NOC as the sole legitimate
institutions.106 However, Tobruk based HOR, refused to recognise the LPA or the
resulting government in Tripoli. This led to several top management crisis of these key
institutions, where HOR in the aftermath of the elections in 2014 appointed new governor
of the CBL, a new chairman of LIA and NOC, and a new management of LPTIC.
However, these appointments were not able to take effect because the western countries
and Islamist camp rejected it and these key institutions headquarter are based in Tripoli
which became under the control of Islamist militia after they successfully expelled HOR
aligned Zintan forces from the capital in late August 2014.107 In addition, Tripoli based
CBL refused to disburse most funds directly to the eastern authorities. 108 This led to the
rival east-based government to establish its own parallel Central Bank (located in
Benghazi and al-Beyda), and National Oil Company (based in Benghazi).109 An HORaligned LPTIC’s headquarters was established in Malta in 2014, and lead to legal battles
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in 2015 between LIA’s rival managements in Libya, UK, Malta and Italy.110 All the
above, led to the current outcome of Libya state failure in the aftermath of intervention in
2011.
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Conclusion

This research has investigated the relation between foreign intervention and state
failure through the Libyan case study. Libya has long been a weak state with weak
institutions which persisted during the Gaddafi regime. Prior to the intervention in 2011
Gaddafi regime’s opening with the western countries since 2003 harvest the seeds for
political change which was reaped by the perceived window of opportunity for regime
change that came with the Arab Spring. Following the intervention, Libya turned into a
failed state. Foreign intervention contributed to Libya’s state failure regardless of its
humanitarian reasoning. As I have shown, this came as a result of the motives of
interveners, the mechanism of the intervention and the outcome of the intervention. There
could have been a possibility of negotiated settlement either through the AU proposal of
ceasefire or Gaddafi potential safe exit.
The motives of the interveners in Libya were mainly self-interest rather than the
declared humanitarian purposes of the R2P civilians. The interveners political end goal
was centred around Gaddafi regime change and the military mission evolved to match the
political goal. The instruments of intervention were both military and non-military
(imposing economic sanctions and arm embargo) under authorization from the UNSC.
Following UNSC authorization, the form of intervention started via France, UK and USA
under the leadership of US then the leadership of the intervention transferred to NATO.
Moreover, the patterns of intervention were a biased intervention that altered the balance
of power in favour of the intervener (supporting the rebels) with aim of helping them
achieve fast victory rather than achieving a negotiated settlement. The time of the
intervention was very crucial as it took place only two days after the passing of UNSC
39

resolution 1973 under the pretext of overstated threat against civilians when it was very
clear that Gaddafi regime’s forces will prevail.
With the ousting of Gaddafi regime, the military intervention ended without engaging
in stabilization phase or state building effort hoping that Libya will stabilize itself. In the
post Gaddafi era, two main rival camps emerged: the civilian camp and the Islamist one
who struggled over the control of political power, security and economic sectors. The
Islamist camp didn’t enjoy wide public support and when they failed to secure majority in
the first elections in 2012, they resorted to violence and intermediations against their
rivals until they dominated the government and GNC. Just like Gaddafi, they also tried to
establish parallel army and police through integrating their loyal militia in the police and
army. When the Islamists lost the second election in 2014, they resorted to violence again
through its affiliated militia to seize control of the capital by force and refused to hand
over power to the new elected HOR. This led to the split of Libya into two regionally
based rival governments and parliaments and military confrontation between their allied
armed groups. The struggle also extended to the control of key economic institutions
based in Tripoli.
When the political influence of the Islamist camp declined, as it suffered from lack of
internal legitimacy and international recognition. The same foreign interveners intervened
again. The motive of intervention in the post conflict transition was again based on selfinterest rather than negotiating a real peaceful political settlement and rebuilding the
institutions of torn Libya, particularly the security sector. The form of intervention was
not only multilateral under the umbrella of UN and the authority of UNSC Resolutions,
but also unilateral under the threat of sanctions by USA, UK, France, and Italy. The
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patterns of intervention were also a biased intervention in support of the Tripoli based
Islamist camp to assure the sole legitimacy of key financial institutions under their
control to secure existing oil contracts and to impose the Islamist biased UN negotiated
LPA which deliberately undermined the chances of reaching a power-sharing deal to
overcome institutional and military fractures. The outcome of the LPA is a third
government (GNA) that is internationally recognized, and which became under the
effective control of the Islamist affiliated militia with little if any control in the capital,
which perpetuate Libya’s status as a failed state.
Recognizing the current crisis, the UNAP launched in September 2017 functioned
mainly as a lip service solution to resort for undetermined election rather than correcting
the LPA to be more inclusive as well as building security institutions that include a
national army and police forces to supplant militias. The international community
hastened elections in Libya in the aftermath of the intervention to confer legitimacy on
their new governmental partners, while the government lacking essential capacity to
govern was part of the problem.111 Moreover, the security situation on the ground can
predetermine the elections outcome and even the basic necessary legal framework and
technical arrangement are not in place yet. This led to different unfulfilled deadlines.
Had the motives and pattern of intervention being different in the Libyan case with
more emphasis on protecting civilian and reaching a negotiated settlement without
backing certain factions the ultimate outcome of the intervention would have been
different. This is a very costly lesson that yet to be learned.
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